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**Transforming Postcommunist Militaries:  
Professionalisation of Armed Forces  
in Central and Eastern Europe**

Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds  
and Andrew Cottey

Working Paper 30/01

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# **Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalisation of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe**

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Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey

July 2001

*This report summarises the presentations and discussions at a conference on 'Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalisation of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe', held at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, 26-29 April 2001. The conference was funded by the Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe, UK Ministry of Defence.*

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*The abstracts presented in this report are the editor's summaries of the conference papers and arguments. The views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the JSCSC or the Ministry of Defence or any other agency of the British government.*

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## PART ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ANTHONY FORSTER, TIM EDMUNDS AND ANDREW COTTEY

- There is considerable confusion over the terms ‘professional’ armed forces and ‘professionalisation’ of the military. For some these are largely descriptive terms referring to volunteer rather than conscript forces. For others, these are normative terms pertaining to armed forces non-involvement in domestic politics and their ability to carry out military activities in an effective and efficient manner.
- The conference organisers argue that professional armed forces are most usefully defined as militaries which accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government of the state and are able to undertake military activities in an effective and efficient way and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions. Professional armed forces are defined by four core characteristics: clearly defined and widely accepted roles in relation both to external functions and domestic society; maintenance of the expertise necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently; clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers; promotion based on achievement.
- In this context, it is possible to have both different models of professional armed forces and *degrees* of professionalism. Four models suggested by the conference organisers are: a *Power Projection Model*; a *Territorial Defence Model*; a *Post-Neutral Model*; and a *Neutral model*.
- Professionalisation processes are being driven by a variety of different factors. These include the technological influences of the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’; the changed international geopolitical environment and the changing ways in which military force is utilised (for example in peace support operations rather than more traditional war-fighting capacities); and changes in the relationship between society and

the military. In central and eastern Europe, the implicit conditionality inherent in the NATO accession process has a defining influence over the nature of military reform.

- The states of central and eastern Europe are all in the process of reforming – and to varying degrees professionalising – their armed forces. Within the region however, there is a rather narrow view as to what professionalisation is – with a ‘professional’ military often equated with an ‘all-volunteer’ military. More broadly, there is a perception in both the ‘West’ and ‘East’ that modern, professional armed forces conform to very particular type – orientated towards power projection. According to this model, a modern, ‘professionalised’ military is all-volunteer, flexible, joint, interoperable, high-tech and deployable ‘out of area’. Crucially, ‘ideal’ NATO forces, and hence the criteria for NATO accession, lean heavily towards this model. There remains a real question as to the appropriateness of this model of armed forces for many of the countries of central and eastern Europe.
- Across the region, national defence priorities are influenced by two imperatives: the defence of national territory and accession to NATO. The first of these addresses national security concerns by the development of indigenous armed forces, designed around the requirements of a particular national security concept. The second attempts to address national security through accession to an alliance. Significantly, the requirements demanded by each of these imperatives can sometimes be contradictory. In Estonia for example, tensions have emerged between force structures geared towards ‘total defence’ to meet the demands of the first imperative, and the need for NATO compatible, externally deployable, resource intensive rapid reaction forces to meet the demands of the second. These frictions are intensified by the limited resources generally allocated to defence in the region.
- These tensions are starkest in those states who have adopted the ‘total defence’ strategy, but who also aspire to NATO membership. These include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Each of these states has

also faced building armed forces from 'the ground up'. A second group of states – the so-called Visegrad Three (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) plus Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia face similar, if less dramatic conflicts between these two imperatives. These states are all attempting to balance the development of modernised, though still predominantly land-based, force structures for national defence, and rapid reaction or 'power projection' forces for NATO-orientated external missions.

- A third group of states, including Russia, Ukraine and the FRY, face a quite different set of problems in relation to military reform. In these countries the prospect of NATO membership is either remote or non-existent. Moreover, in Russia and Ukraine at least, the scale of the task of military reform (or even tentative professionalisation) is on a much greater scale to other parts of the region. In addition it is complicated by factors such as economic crisis, the involvement of the military in conflict (Chechnya, Kosovo etc), and the existence of large, alternative military structures such as Interior Ministry forces.
- These frictions raise important questions both for NATO and the central and eastern European states themselves. Most significantly, what will happen to processes of military reform in the region if NATO accession is delayed or fails to materialise? If NATO accession does occur, then what happens afterwards? The continuing problems faced by the Visegrad Three illustrate that NATO membership is not a panacea which will solve all problems. It is crucial that potential NATO members have a coherent vision of where their military reform processes are going *post*-accession if they are to maintain credible systems of national defence, and remain credible members of the Alliance.
- For its part, NATO (and indeed the 'West' more broadly) needs to think hard about the applicability and appropriateness of the 'power projection' model of armed forces for the states of central and eastern Europe (and indeed for some of its pre-existing member states such as Germany or Spain). There is also a clear need to recognise the importance of non-

traditional military structures in states such as Russia, Ukraine and the FRY, and to strive to engage them in its Outreach and defence diplomacy programmes.

## PART TWO: ABSTRACTS

### **Professionalisation of Armed Forces: A Framework for Analysis**

*Dr Anthony Forster*

*Kings College London / Joint Services Command and Staff  
College*

There is considerable confusion over the terms 'professional' armed forces and 'professionalisation' of the military. For some these are largely descriptive terms pertaining to the core social and political characteristics of professional, as distinct from conscript, soldiers. For others, these are normative terms pertaining to armed forces non-involvement in domestic politics and their ability to carry out military activities in an effective and efficient manner. Professional and professionalism are also often equated with the dominant models of armed forces emerging in post-Cold War western Europe and north America or volunteer (i.e., entirely non-conscript) armed forces.

Our research team argues that professional armed forces are most usefully defined as militaries which accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government of the state and are able to undertake military activities in an effective and efficient way and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions. Professional armed forces are defined by four core characteristics: clearly defined and widely accepted roles in relation both to external functions and domestic society; maintenance of the expertise necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently; clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers; promotion based on achievement. Professional armed forces, however, should not necessarily be equated with the military model to which most NATO/western countries now aspire (i.e., entirely or largely volunteer armed forces capable of forcefully projecting military power beyond national boundaries). Indeed, we argue that there are at least four distinct models or types of professional armed forces in western

Europe and north America (*'power projection'*, *'territorial defence'*, *'post-neutral'* and *'neutral'* models).

Against the background of the legacy of their communist era militaries, the countries of central and eastern Europe face great challenges in attempting to professionalise their armed forces. The success or failure of professionalisation, and the models of armed forces adopted by the countries of central and eastern Europe, are likely to be influenced by a wide range of factors, including national threat perceptions, new missions, international pressure, domestic politics, economic constraints and national military cultures. There is a need for more serious debate on how the countries of central and eastern Europe may best pursue professionalisation of their armed forces and the types of armed forces most appropriate for them.

## **The 'Postmodern Military'**

*Professor John Allen Williams*

*Loyola University Chicago*

The 'postmodern military' takes its name from intellectual and social trends evident after the Cold War. The main features of postmodernism for our purposes include the subversion of absolute values, relativism, ambiguity, and the permeability of institutions. These are seen in such diverse examples as architectural styles, literary criticism, and social theory. They help define the milieu in which modern militaries operate. Postmodernism is also reflected in certain organizational changes of modern militaries, from the diminution of differences between civilian and military tasks and between officer and enlisted personnel to the internationalisation of the use of military force. In particular, the traditional bases of national sovereignty are eroded by the globalisation of communication, trade, and finance.

These social trends have a disproportionate impact on Western militaries after the end of the Cold War with the decrease in traditional military threats. In this situation, the willingness to use the military in pursuit of other values increased, including domestic social and international humanitarian issues. Conventional wisdom suggests that political factors determine civil-military relations, including political control of the military. We do not discount their importance, but suggest that underlying social factors are even more crucial, providing the context in which the political factors operate.

As part of our own study, knowledgeable military sociologists from twelve Western democracies (including Israel and South Africa) prepared case studies on the evolution of civil-military relations in their countries in three periods, which approximate before, during, and after the Cold War. All authors spoke to a common matrix of variables expected to change in similar directions, including the threat, force structure, major mission definition, dominant military professional, public attitude toward the military, media relations, civilian employees, women's role, spouses, sexual orientation, and conscientious objection.

Certain commonalities were seen across the three time periods for the countries studied. These have implications for military culture and for military leadership. The degree to which the model is applicable to post-Communist militaries is unproven, but post-Communist societies exhibit certain developments in common with Western democracies that make it likely that the model is applicable in that setting, as well.

## **Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention: Implications for Armed Forces**

*Professor Christopher Bellamy*  
*Cranfield University*

The influence of Peace Support Operations (PSO's) on the development of post Cold War armed forces is significant, and relates strongly to the more general trend towards smaller, lighter and more mobile force structures. These developments serve to reinforce the professionalism and effectiveness of the armed forces concerned. This assessment is in contrast to a view currently prevalent in the US which suggests that involvement in PSO's detracts from the war-fighting abilities of armed forces, and results in a *de-professionalisation* of the military. In practice, however, experience has shown that a professional military can effectively combine combat readiness with effectiveness in PSO's, and that successful PSO's are, in many respects, dependent on quite traditional military forces and requirements. Armed forces who are successful in PSO's, tend to be high-tech, complex forces. In contrast, lower tech, less professional militaries are sometimes net consumers rather than net contributors to PSO's, particularly, if, for example they find themselves in situations where they have to be rescued from trouble. Thus, professionalism – or its absence – is a crucial requirement for an effective peacekeeping force.

These trends are likely to be reflected in the nature of future PSO's. In particular, command is likely to shift from the UN to other sources such as regional alliances or coalitions of the willing (though the UN is likely to remain an important source of legitimacy in any such situation). Moreover trends towards the urbanisation of PSO's, and the frequency of more complex emergencies (such as natural disasters) suggest that the demands on armed forces engaged in PSO's are like to remain high, and demand high levels of professionalism. As Marshal Maurice de Saxe noted in 1757, 'it is not the big armies that win battles, but the good ones'.

## **Strategic Defence Choices in Central and Eastern Europe**

*Dr Andrzej Karkoszka*

*Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces*

Strategic defence choices in central and eastern Europe (CEE) have been shaped by six main factors. The first factor, particularly prevalent in the early 1990's, is threat perception especially in relation to a residual Russian threat. Second, there is strong 'anti-Yaltaism', expressed in a desire to end what is seen as an artificial East/West division in Europe. Essentially, states in CEE wish to end their ghettoisation in the category of 'Eastern Europe'. Third, defence choices have been strongly influenced by the nature of domestic political and economic transition. Fourth, CEE is keen to facilitate the projection of West European stability eastwards, and in as pro-active a manner as possible. Fifth, much of the region feels that it has a traditional historical and cultural affiliation with the 'West', and is eager to 'return to Europe'. Finally, the developing geopolitical situation in Europe – again, particularly with regards to Russia – is an important driver influencing CEE choices in this sphere.

These influences have created in five main strategic options for states in the CEE region. The first is to try and join NATO. The second is to try and join the EU (and in doing so to access a 'quasi-guarantee' from NATO). The third is to try and 'go it alone' by pursuing a policy of non-alignment. The fourth is to create a CEE Baltic-Black Sea group or band. The final option is turn fully eastwards, and make some kind of accommodation with Russia (in the Polish case justified as a hedge against Germany). In practice most of CEE has opted for the NATO accession option, aiming for EU accession as a 'second track'.

## **Professionalisation and Military Training in Central and Eastern Europe**

*Janis Kazocins*

*Commander, British Military Advisory and Training Team for Central and Eastern Europe*

The British Military Advisory and Training Team for central and eastern Europe (BMATT) aims to promote the professionalisation of central and eastern European armed forces through the provision of regionally based training. The BMATT approach is focused around four concepts. First, that the ethos of the military should be rooted in domestic society and should not be imposed from the outside. Second, that a 'train the trainers' approach is the most effective way to inculcate change. Third that the vehicle for this training should be infantry tactics. Fourth, that maintaining a flexibility in approach is crucial.

In this context, BMATT has identified several core principles for the provision of military training assistance.

- Trainers should concentrate on what they are good at. For the UK this means defence management and higher-level planning, and basic leadership and infantry tactics.
- Train the trainers. It is more worthwhile to construct self-sustaining indigenous training systems than short term 'direct' training of individuals or units.
- The importance of ethos over tactics. Military training should be about how to do things, not what to do.
- Develop the key characteristics of leadership: responsibility; professional integrity; and respect for subordinates.
- Select the right students – those who want to learn and teach.
- Be flexible in relation to English language skills. It is better to teach 70 per cent to someone with poor English who will pass it on, than 100 per cent to a good English speaker who will be sent to Brussels.

- Perspective. Military training assistance is a protracted process. Do not expect quick solutions or rapid success. Good students need to be followed up and supported in the long-term.
- No one has a monopoly on good ideas, and training must be a two-way street. If students are shown respect, they will learn to respect both their trainers and their own subordinates.

BMATT is a long term investment, and there are no quick fix solutions. BMATT graduates from the Baltic States from 1994-95, for example, are only now beginning to have an impact on their own armed forces. In this context, it is important to be able to take a long term view of reform, with the aim of eventually creating a 'critical mass' which will allow domestic professionalisation processes to become self-sustaining.

### **The Role of Western Assistance**

*Professor Jeffrey Simon*

*US National Defense University*

Western assistance to central and eastern Europe in relation to the reform of armed forces has been extensive since the early 1990's. In practice, this assistance has helped to promote reform in certain areas, particularly through, for example, training a cadre of military leaders who are now in influential positions, or through promoting institutional restructuring. However, western assistance has also failed to address the need for reform in several key areas. In particular, problems persist in the areas of parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, and institutional capacities within Ministries of Defence. The weakness of parliamentary oversight in the region results from limited civilian (and hence parliamentary) expertise, or even interest in, military matters. In addition, institutional incapacity has had negative implications in the areas of military personnel issues, acquisition, and democratic mechanisms for defence budgeting and planning.

There is also a need to recognise that different groups of countries face different sorts of challenges – and so require different kinds of aid. Smaller countries – such as the Baltic States – present different challenges from, for example, the larger countries of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact. Similarly, newly independent countries face a different set of problems, to established states. Differences also emerge between different clusters of states as a result of their particular relationships with NATO (for example between the ‘Visegrad Three’ or the ‘MAP Nine’). Finally western states need to be cognisant of the potential frictions between their own various bilateral (and sometimes multilateral) assistance programmes to the region. Often these duplicate or compete with each other, sometimes sending out very different messages. This lack of complementarity between programmes can exacerbate confusion in the region and slow processes of reform.

### **Professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces**

*Dr Paul Latawski*

*Royal Military Academy Sandhurst*

The development of professionalisation in the Polish armed forces has steadily moved the focus of the armed services towards a power projection focus and the erosion of the territorial defence posture. These changes – as reflected in force structure and capabilities – are in line with a security and defence policy geared to membership of NATO and a domestic political elite consensus that accepts the need for Polish involvement in crisis management operations. Thus, in practice, the Polish armed forces do fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state, and are able to conduct military activities in an effective and efficient manner. Today’s Polish armed forces fit a definition of professionalism based around these criteria, and are likely to become more ‘professional’ in the future.

In Poland, the professionalisation of armed forces is understood in narrow terms as meaning ultimately the creation of all-volunteer professional forces. As a matter of national policy, trends in the evolution of the armed forces

suggest that this may be the goal under serious consideration even if it is not a matter of public policy. The idea of moving to all-volunteer professional armed services is now being more seriously debated in Poland with both the chairman of the parliamentary defence committee and the Defence Minister indicating that a high proportion of the military may be all volunteer by the end of the decade. This optimal military solution, however, inevitably has to be reconciled with political and economic considerations in a democratic state. For Poland, in the short to medium term, economic considerations are undoubtedly a limiting factor behind the continued reliance on conscription. However, as a long-term proposition, all-volunteer forces are considered to be more cost effective and generally better able to meet the requirements of their political masters. In the Polish case, the long-term trends point to a shift to all-volunteer professional forces in the next decade.

### **Professionalisation of the Army in the Czech Republic**

*Dr Marie Vlachova*

*Research Department, Ministry of Defence of the Czech  
Republic*

Following ten years of shaping the reform of the armed forces, politicians, the public, and military professionals are coming to the conclusion that the future of the Czech army lies with full professionalisation. Although the prerequisites for such a radical change and its consequences for the nature of the armed forces are more clearly formulated now than at the onset of 1990's, a number of aspects of professionalisation are perceived in an overly simplified and pragmatic manner. Thanks to the shift in the Czech Republic's strategic position after gaining NATO membership, it appears that there is a sufficient willingness to make a political decision which would start the process of full professionalisation. Nonetheless, it seems that discussions on professionalisation of the military emerge on the political scene regularly only during pre-election periods. The Czech public - especially the younger generation which would be most directly affected by the process - supports professionalisation, and politicians are well aware that including this topic in

election campaigns will bring them valuable points in their quest for votes. The answer to the most important question, i.e. what would be the cost of professionalisation, is not discussed, and it is unclear whether civilian and military experts are paying serious attention to this issue. The obsolete nature of a substantial quantity of armaments and military equipment, poor existing conditions for training and education of soldiers, an unsuitable personnel management system, a limited ability to recruit young people and retain them in service for the necessary length of time, substandard social conditions for work and life of professional soldiers, the poor shape of reserves, and the declining availability of human resources will probably prevent the Czech Republic from abolishing the conscription model until 10 to 15 years from now.

There has been a noticeable shift from the beginning of 1990's when the idea to use professionalisation to resolve the main problems of transformation of the Czech armed forces appeared for the first time. This change is reflected in efforts to define the important factors of the transformation process, to analyse its pros and cons, and to reach a political consensus about the future shape of the Czech military based on informed discussions and sound arguments. Only the preparation process, which the Czech society and its armed forces are now facing, will show the extent to which the desire to have a modern army comparable to Western European professional forces is realistic in light of the country's economy and the skills and abilities of potential recruits.

## **Building Professional Competence in Hungary's Defence: Slow Motion**

*Dr Pal Dunay*

*Geneva Centre for Security Policy*

The most important problems of the political and economical evolution in Hungary are not related to security or to the defence sector. Hungary is in an enviably safe international environment, which is sufficiently conducive not to interfere with its internal development. Furthermore, it has been a member of a powerful alliance since 1999. Hungary's military reforms should, therefore, be contemplated in light of this broader framework and set against other, more pressing issues on the agenda of the government.

Hungary's recent military reforms point in the direction of a gradual professionalisation of its armed forces. For different reasons, the reduction of the size of the armed forces, and the creation of a 'leaner and meaner' defence sector has gained priority in the process lately. However, the question to be addressed is whether the current strategic review is carried out in preparation for a more decisive, large-scale reform at a later stage, or whether the political establishment assumes that this is the last reform to be implemented for a long time to come. In practice, the government and the defence establishment have not yet decided what importance to attribute to the defence of the territory of the country (self-defence), the contribution of the Hungarian defence forces to the tasks of the Atlantic Alliance and the importance of developing a power projection capability more generally. In light of this it has not been able to conclude whether Hungary needs a fully professional small 'elite' armed force or whether it is enough to simply improve and downsize the earlier defence structure. It is a reflection of this that the new structure has not departed from the mass army concept neither has conscription been abolished.

When one takes a closer look to the steps taken in the direction of professionalisation it can be concluded that they have remained half-hearted.

In certain areas the government has not been able to free itself of political prejudices, as in the case of the early abolition of conscription. The modernisation of armaments and equipment has not yet reached the stage that would make the advantages of a professional armed force evident. This critical assessment should give recognition to the fact nevertheless that Hungary has embarked upon putting into practice a military reform though belatedly and hesitantly.

### **Professionalisation of the Romanian Armed Forces**

*Mr Marian Zulean*

*Office of the Romanian Presidency*

The historical legacy of the Romanian armed forces has had a strong impact on their processes of transition and professionalisation. Although Romania was part of the Warsaw Pact, the Romanian Army was of a neutralist type, with a nationalistic doctrine ('the war of the entire people'), and the recruiting was based purely conscription. The Army was involved, in December 1989, in a bloody 'revolution', that eventually became both a 'founding sin' and provided legitimacy for their transformation.

During the first stage of defence reform, Romania downsized the Army under the provision of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and proceeded to de-communisation the military under the guidance of organisations such as CADA (the Action Committee for Democratisation of the Army). Later, Romania made a clear commitment to join NATO and was the first country to sign the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Treaty. With the NATO accession process came a set of requirements for professionalisation of the Armed Forces, under both the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Membership Action Plans (MAP). As a result, Romania has drastically downsized its military establishment to a strength of 155,000 people in 2000 (55 per cent of its 1990 total); has established a Conception for Human Resource Management; created a new force structure called FARO 2005, which envisages a level of 112,000 military personnel and 28,000 civilians

and an officer/NCO ratio to 1/3; introduced a guide for promoting the military as a career option; and introduced a guide for re-settling those personnel who leave the armed forces.

Moreover, Romania has changed the role and expertise of Armed Forces to focus more on professional expertise and military utility; has approved a National Security Strategy, a Military Defense Doctrine and a White House of the Government, and has a Law of defence planning that regulates the way in which all of the above should be done. As a result, the Romanian armed forces are in the process of being transformed from a neutralist type to a Western Territorial Defence type.

### **Professionalisation of the Armed Forces in Slovakia**

*Marybeth Peterson Ulrich*

*US Army War College*

Slovakia's vital national interests include the defence of its national independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the Slovak state. Of the models developed in this project, territorial defence is the best fit to achieve these vital interests. A strategic appraisal of the Slovak Republic identifies neither a specific foreign power as a threat nor the existence of any outstanding territorial claims with its neighbours. Slovakia's security aspirations hinge on NATO membership with its guarantee of collective defense and its commitment embodied in the new Strategic Concept to use Alliance resources to export stability to the former Soviet bloc. Slovakia's overall democratic transition also depends on its integration into transatlantic and Western European political, economic, and security infrastructures.

The overwhelming factor influencing the professionalisation of the armed forces of Central and Eastern Europe is the general context of overwhelming political, economic, and social change. Post-communist militaries are facing many challenges: the divergence of societal and military values, the structural and ideological reform of their forces, and the contradictions between old

Soviet era patterns of behaviour and Western democratic standards for military institutions. In addition, scarce economic resources and increased transparency of all government institutions have contributed to the loss of status and prestige of many post-communist officer corps.

Slovakia, not unlike its postcommunist neighbours, faces numerous obstacles on both its path of democratisation and the subordinate task of transforming its national security institutions to meet the security needs of a democratic state. These multi-layered transitions are intrinsically linked and lapses in one aspect of Slovakia's democratic transition will necessarily have an impact on others. The good news is that the current Slovak government has set a sensible course for political, economic, and military reform. The more sobering news is that this course is dependent on resource requirements that severely constrain the pace of progress in addition to overcoming other cultural baggage from the communist era that still permeates Slovak bureaucratic institutions and political culture.

Outside actors who recognise that the successful transformation of postcommunist societies is a fundamental security interest, and who engage in understanding emergent professionalisation trends can positively influence these processes. Successfully wielding external levers, while competently providing targeted expertise and resources will help to accelerate the pace of reform.

## **The New Model Army? Bulgarian Experiences of Professionalisation**

*Dr Laura Cleary*

*University of Stirling*

The priority of Bulgarian defence reform is to enhance the military's ability to provide for national defence. The language employed in the *National Security Concept* and *Military Doctrine* and the public statements of ministers indicate a keen desire to participate in peace-keeping and humanitarian missions. This stated desire is, however, tempered by the actions and attitudes prevalent within the National Assembly which means that Bulgaria has only a modest ability to participate in such missions. Realistically, given the size of the country's population, its geographical location and its level of financial resources, Bulgaria can only field a small, predominantly land based force. Proposals for reform of the military education system seek to enhance Bulgaria's ability to contribute to NATO led forces. Since these reforms are still in the planning stage, expertise, training and operation skills remain at a relatively low level. Role specialisation does exist, but the skills are exercised predominantly within the national territory. Given the concentration on developing crisis management systems and relevant expertise this is unlikely to change.

The source of recruitment for the armed forces is likely to remain conscript based for the foreseeable future. As democratic principles are embedded into both military and civilian systems it is likely that personnel with different skill bases and an ability to adapt to changing environments will emerge. The implementation of democratic principles, the introduction of a new management culture and the streamlining of existing structures should result in more responsive command and control chains and the recognition of merit as a basis of promotion.

Bulgaria has succeeded in defining the role and mission of the armed forces. It gives the appearance of wanting to serve NATO, and to a limited extent the EU, in the manner in which it served the WTO, by protecting the south-

eastern flank. Whether this is a realistic assessment of Bulgaria's capabilities remains to be seen. It would be fair to say that inclusion within these alliances would mean a recognition of worth and would provide Bulgaria with a specific role, which could then be used as an impetus for further development. The continued progress and success of defence reform, however, will depend entirely on a number of factors internal to the state. The economic situation will need to remain stable and to improve, the government must adhere to its declarations on the necessity of combating corruption, and a shared culture of interest and respect must develop between civilian and military personnel. Most importantly, attitudes towards reform must become proactive instead of reactive. Bulgaria cannot continue to rely solely on external factors to drive its reform process, certainly not if it wishes to develop its own internal security framework and become an integral part of the European security infrastructure.

### **The Estonian Defence Forces: Modernising Defence**

*Lt Col German Kesa*

*Estonian Army*

Independence in 1991 meant that Estonia had to build a new defence force 'from scratch'. While much work has been done in this area over the past 10 years, the process of modernisation has been painful and challenges remain. Three key themes have shaped the modernisation of the Estonian Defence Forces. First, the new geopolitical environment of the post Cold War world. Second, how best to spend the scarce resources allocated to defence, with a focus on value for money. Finally, how to get the best from the Estonian national manpower pool for defence, particularly in relation to the balance between professionals, volunteers and reservists and the key social (rather than purely military) role played by conscription. In addition, influences and imperatives which will impact on the future development of the EDF include: first, the lack of a clear military threat to Estonia at present; second, the engagement of the EDF in crisis management operations abroad; and third, a continuing pressure on the national defence budget.

Against this background, Estonia has concluded that future NATO membership is the most effective strategy for responding to challenges and threats to the security of the state. However, preparations for potential NATO accession have not been without problems. There remains a strong constituency within Estonia (and the Estonian military) which believes that the Scandinavian neutrality model is a more appropriate goal for the EDF than joining NATO. In particular, some see NATO's requirements in terms of force structure and interoperability as being both costly and incompatible with current national defence structures. Moreover, they suggest that tactically, NATO membership does not fit with the Estonian conception of 'total' national defence.

However, despite these doubts, a strong consensus has emerged that NATO membership is the best way forward for the EDF. As a result, Estonia has committed itself to spending two per cent of its GDP per annum on defence, and is developing a force structure which will allow the EDF to participate in NATO mission. In practice, the EDF will be divided into four components. First, a crisis management 'Immediate Reaction Force', which will be able to deploy within 24 hours. Second, a 'Rapid Reaction Force', deployable in 30 days. Third and fourth, the EDF has the medium and low readiness elements of the main defence force, which must be mobilised, and will be able to deploy within 180 days. Personnel issues have also been prioritised, and Estonia is devoting significant efforts towards improving the skill levels of its military personnel; introducing initiatives to reward leadership, initiative and effort; and improving the pay and living conditions of the armed forces.

## **Professionalising the Latvian Armed Forces**

*Jan Trapans*

*University of Groningen*

In Latvia the central issues of professionalisation are fundamentally the same as those in the rest of central and eastern Europe. There are international factors, domestic factors, and legacies from the recent past. However, their relative weight is different. In Latvia's case, the international factor, and particularly the wish to join NATO, is very important. Therefore, international influence, or conditionality, is pervasive and strong. Moreover, domestically, the weakness of the Latvian economy has delayed defence development. There is also the legacy of the recent past. This has two aspects. The Soviet Army with all of its weapons, equipment, military infrastructure and educational institutions disappeared from Latvia. As a result, and unlike most central and eastern European countries – who are adjusting and reforming the huge, heavy military establishments that they inherited from the Warsaw Pact – Latvia has had to build a new type of armed forces from the ground up. However, although much of the Soviet past is gone physically, a psychological remnant has remained in civilian as well as military minds.

Latvia's security concept states three main goals. First, the armed forces have to have adequate strength to protect the country's sovereignty. Second, Latvia will cooperate with the Baltic States for regional defence development. Third, Latvia intends to join NATO and the armed forces must be ready to enter the Alliance. There is some overlap in these three objectives, but each one has its own specific requirements. A feasible defence posture has to be based on Latvia's limited economic resources and small population. The ability of defence planners to balance national, regional, and Alliance-orientated requirements on the one hand, and to provide the needed resources on the other is a measure of their professionalism.

Latvia's armed forces have been developed in response to these imperatives. In common with the other Baltic States, they consist of a conscript core,

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backed by a larger volunteer reserve. Categorised by a typology of professional armed forces in Western Europe, they are rather small, predominantly land based, with a limited capacity to participate in peacekeeping missions. Latvia has adopted Finland's defence posture of denial, together with the strategy of 'territorial defence' or 'total defence'. In this model, a small country aims to deny any aggressor an objective, decisive or easy victory. Close cooperation with the other Baltic States would also act as an effective force multiplier. NATO has also had a strong influence on the development of the Latvian Armed Forces, particularly in the development of new command, control and communications systems, logistics systems, resource management, and training concepts. However, the development of interoperability with NATO is an expensive business, and has seen the shifting of defence priorities towards special units that are NATO compatible, even if they do not fit into the national force structure. This illustrates the tensions between the NATO compatible armed forces and the optimum force structure which results from Latvia's national security concept.

### **Lithuanian Armed Forces: Reestablishment, Professionalisation, Integration**

*Mr Robertas Sapronas*

*Lithuanian Ministry of Defence*

The role, missions, the main structural elements, and other major aspects of the Lithuanian Armed Forces are defined in the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security (1996). These subjects are further elaborated in the Law on Organisation of Armed Forces (1998) and in the National Security Strategy (2000). There is a broad consensus among the political parties in Lithuania about the need to establish a credible defence force. This force should deter an aggressor and, if not, should be able to inflict considerable damage on the attacking force, making the cost of aggression unacceptable. If, however, Lithuania is a member of a military alliance, the task is to delay an advance of the attacking force until support arrives, and to defend the entry points for the

reinforcements. Each of the two options requires somewhat different force structure and tactics.

The debate on the optimal structure of the Armed Forces has never really been over. In the essence, this is very much a debate about whether Lithuania is more likely to face aggression alone or in an alliance. An answer to this question would make clear the priorities for defence spending and development of force structures, though of course a concentration on one option does not completely exclude the other. In the case of having to fight without external support, Lithuania would make its main investment in the development of territorial defence forces and the creation of a large (mainly low skilled) military force, which would engage the enemy over the entire territory of the country. Operations with NATO support would require a very different approach, with a stress on quality rather than quantity, and on the mobility and deployability of troops. Major investments would have to be concentrated in the area of improving NATO interoperability of the Lithuanian Armed Forces.

In practice, however, Lithuania's defence investment priorities are increasingly shifting from the creation of territorial defence forces towards development of mobile, NATO interoperable units. This results from the increasing participation of Lithuanian troops in international PSO's in Bosnia and Kosovo, an anticipation invitation to join NATO at the next summit, and a gradual improvement of security relations with Russia.

## **Professionalisation of the Slovenian Armed Forces**

*Mr Erik Kopac*

*University of Ljubljana*

The Yugoslav conflict has had a profound effect on Slovenian security policy. In particular, the ten day 'mini-war' of June and July 1991 strongly influenced perceptions of threat in the newly independent state, as well as the attitude of the public towards security, defence and the military in general. After the 'mini-war', Slovenia strove to achieve security at two different levels. At a national level, the country made an effort to build up its national security system, which in the past had been reliant on the federal state to a great extent. At an international level, Slovenia worked towards participation in key Euro-Atlantic economic, political and security organisations within NATO and the EU. One of the crucial tasks in the creation of the national security system was the formation of the armed force from scratch. Indeed, Slovenia had inherited only the ill-equipped Territorial Defence forces from the former Yugoslav state. Internationally, the most important task facing Slovenia has been the development of NATO interoperability in relation to armament, training and tactics.

While in recent years domestic threat perceptions have largely shifted to focus around non-military factors such as crime, drugs, the environment and the economy, the character of military reform in Slovenia has been continues to be driven by the country's desire to join NATO. Against this background, Slovenia has implemented a variety of reforms in order to professionalise its armed forces and develop their interoperability with the NATO Alliance. A process of force restructuring has been implemented, which aims to create a professional Rapid Reaction Force, (RRF) capable of participating in peacekeeping missions abroad by 2010. The RRF will be complemented by the Main Defence Forces (which will be made up primarily of conscripts) and the Reserve Forces (which will be mobilised in time of war). The Slovenian Armed Forces have also initiated significant modernisation programmes in the sphere of military education – which has now been integrated with the civilian university system. Problems remain, however, with command and control

procedures, the (in)efficient use of resources, and promotion and career development mechanisms.

## **A Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs? The Professionalisation of Croatia's Armed Forces**

*Dr Alex J Bellamy*

*Kings College London / Joint Services Command and Staff College*

A revolution in civil-military affairs is underway in Croatia. This revolution is profoundly changing the role, structure and constitution of Croatia's armed forces and is informed by the concept of professionalisation. It is argued that this transformation, very much an on-going project, is predicated on two important shifts in wider Croatian society. Firstly, there was a change in the popular perception of what Croatia was, with society embracing western liberal democracy. Accompanying this was a shift in the Croatian electorate's perception of the world around them. Gone was the idea that Croatia was surrounded by eternal enemies. The change of government in January 2000 also created an opportunity to deepen international cooperation and the array of policy options available to Croatia has grown exponentially as a result.

Throughout its first ten years, Croatian defence policy was greatly influenced by American thinking manifested through assistance from MPRI. Thus, a professional army was viewed as an army comprised of volunteers and wartime experience dictated that a professional soldier was one who proved himself in battle, usually as a tactical commander. Whilst the new government has to a large extent retained this outlook, it now views the path to a professional armed force as being paved by education.

Three key areas that have been identified for reform as part of the Croatian professionalisation process: military education; reform and reappportionment of the defence budget towards education, training, and procurement; and command and control. Reform in each of these areas creates both problems

and opportunities. The central problems endangering the reform process are the economy and the persistent institutional confusion between presidency, government, general staff, and defence ministry. However, the government's willingness to cooperate, and a reciprocal willingness on the part of the international community, creates the possibility for incremental reform across a range of issues. As a result, reform is likely to create professionalised armed forces in Croatia, though this goal is still some way from fruition.

### **Professionalisation and the Yugoslav Army**

*Dr James Gow*

*Kings College London*

The course of professionalisation in the Yugoslav Army (VJ) has been perverted by its experience of war. Formally emerging as the core successor to the old Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), its professional identity has been corrupted by association with systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity. While its creation was accompanied by ideas about and arguments for professionalisation, these lacked any significant realisation of responsibility. There was formal emphasis on professionalisation in terms of the terms under which paid volunteers served in the army, both as career soldiers and as contract personnel. There was also attention to the development of an expert, corporate and responsible force, in contrast to the deeply politicised army that had been the JNA. This was argued for and to a large extent implemented by the younger generation of senior officers who emerged during the war years, tempered by experience in action, such as Generals Vuk Obradovic and Momcilo Perišić, as well as their successors. However, in the circumstances of Serbia and the FRY under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, neither they, nor their successors could wholly avoid involvement in political affairs, as professional judgment and professional self-interest clashed with the FRY president's intentions. With him gone and a new political climate emerging, an army isolated and lacking professional character in the ethical aspect of its work, has a new chance. In particular, its co-operation with NATO-led forces over the Preševo Valley and the GSZ, less

than two years after the end of hostilities between them and NATO over Kosovo, is a major opportunity. It is the chance to forge links and to build co-operation with NATO militaries, bringing them more in line with the paths followed by other former communist countries. It is also the chance for the VJ to show and to use its clear professional competence as the springboard for enhance restraint and responsibility in its professional character.

### **De-Professionalising the Russian Armed Forces**

*Professor Dale Herspring*

*Kansas State University*

The Russian army lacks not only sufficient personnel, but is losing the little expertise it still has. If the current trend continues, it will have even less expertise in the next five years than it has today. The contract system has been a complete failure and both junior officers and contract personnel are leaving in droves. Those who are replacing them are far less qualified than was the case in the past.

Internal military cohesion has almost collapsed. In almost every area, the army has been devastated by the events of the last ten years. Training has almost completely stopped, and discipline is out of control, to name only two areas. Even if one were able to turn things around tomorrow, so much training time has been lost that it will take years to retrain a new military cadre. In addition, the army's disciplinary problems are systemic. Russians do not have the kind of command relationships common to the West. To date, the only approach they have been comfortable with has been brute force. At present, this approach is doing more to undermine discipline than to maintain it. Then, there is the corruption that is widespread throughout the military from generals down to corporals. Finally, the situation with regard to food and pay is almost hopeless. To make matters worse, there are serious questions concerning the reliability of the military. Thus, in practice, the Russian military is becoming less, not more professional.

The Russian military lives in a highly regimented and structured world. It requires clear direction from the political centre when it comes to funds and doctrine. Without both of these items (and the two are closely intertwined), there is little chance that the Russians will be able to reverse this downward trend in professionalisation. For those who have worked closely with Russians this is a sad event. In the past, Russian officers were every bit as technically competent and as militarily well trained as their Western counterparts, even if they lived in a very different and far more brutal political culture. This is no longer the case, and the process of creating a Russian army that will be as professional as the American, British, German or French is a long way away – perhaps even a couple of decades in the future given the serious damage that has been done of professionalism in the Russian military.

### **Professionalisation, Civilian Control and Democracy in Ukraine**

*Mr James Sherr*

*University of Oxford / Conflict Studies Research Centre*

Few officer corps were more professional than that produced by the Soviet military education system. This system inculcated positive traditions as well as negative ones, and as a result of its influence, Ukrainian officers are imbued with the conviction that the Armed Forces must be the tool of policy, rather than the master. Yet this system also inculcated skills, methods and habits of mind at variance with Ukraine's officially proclaimed security requirements.

For one thing, it trained officers to wage combined arms, coalition warfare on an external front and at operational and strategic scales. To Soviet officers it was axiomatic that the danger of war was inherent in the international system. To this day, a large proportion, if not a majority of Ukraine's military officers find suspect, even immoral, the notion that the state should be without armed forces designed to repel large-scale aggression, if only for a limited period. Yet, the new State Programme declares that 'the use of full-scale military force.....has little probability'. Its clear emphasis is on countering emergency

situations and 'low intensity conflict'. An ethos of professionalism inconsistent with these requirements does not contribute to national security.

An even more obdurate legacy of Soviet professionalism has been the military establishment's conception of 'civilian control'. In the USSR civilian control of defence was at both pervasive and narrowly focused. Thus, the strength of civilian control persuaded the Party to entrust the military with a monopoly in the military-technical sphere. In practice, this tradition is a hindrance to the realisation of a concept and programme which emphasise the importance of communication, transparency and trust between state and society, not to say between the Armed Forces and other bodies responsible for anticipating and responding to emergency and crisis. It has also fostered a widespread conception that 'civilian democratic control' is synonymous with control by a democratically elected President.

A third legacy of Soviet professionalism is much in evidence in the thinking and methods of Ukraine's principal security service and its principal organ of law enforcement: the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Interior. As Ukraine's limited democracy has become more authoritarian and less democratic, the security services are beginning once again to assume some of their traditional functions of administrative control. To ask what remains of the prime 'national security priority' set out in the National Security Concept – 'strengthening civil society' – is therefore to ask a rhetorical question.

The conclusion would appear inescapable. In defence and security as in other domains, the main shortcoming in Ukraine is not an absence of 'professionalism', but a lack of correspondence between the state's declared goals and the existence of institutions with the ethos, means and skills to bring them into effect.

## PART THREE: APPENDICES

### ANNEX 1: CONFERENCE AGENDA

#### Day One: Thursday 26<sup>th</sup> April

- 14:00-19:00** Arrival of Participants  
**18:00-18:30** Drinks Reception, (Ramslade Room)  
**18:30-20:00** Dinner (Main Dining Hall)

#### Day Two: Friday 27<sup>th</sup> April

- 07:00-08:30** Breakfast (Main Dining Hall)  
**09:15-09:30** ***Welcome and Introduction***  
*Air Vice Marshal Brian Burridge, Commandant JSCSC*
- 09:30-10:30** ***Professionalising Post-Cold War Armed Forces***  
Session One *Chair: Dr Andrew Cottey, University of Bradford*
- **Professionalisation of Armed Forces: A Framework for Analysis**  
Dr Anthony Forster, KCL/JSCSC
  - **Discussant**  
Dr Owen Greene, University of Bradford
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee (Ramslade Room)  
**11:00-12:30** ***Armed Forces in the Post Cold War World***  
Session Two *Chair: Dr Tim Edmunds, KCL/JSCSC*
- **The 'Postmodern Military'**  
Professor John Allen Williams, Loyola University Chicago
  - **Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Intervention: Implications for Armed Forces**  
Professor Christopher Bellamy, Cranfield University
- 12:30-13:30** Lunch (Main Dining Hall)

- 13:30-15:00**     ***Military Reform: Challenges for Central and Eastern Europe***  
 Session  
 Three             *Chair: Professor Peter Volten, University of Groningen*
- **Strategic Defence Choices in CEE**  
     Dr Andrzej Karkoszka, DCAF
  - **Professionalisation and Military Training in CEE**  
     Brigadier Janis Kazocins, BMATT CEE
  - **The Role of Western Assistance**  
     Professor Jeffrey Simon, US National Defense University
- 15:00-15:30**     Coffee (Ramslade Room)
- 15:30-17:00**     ***Central and Eastern European Experiences: The New NATO Members***  
 Session Four     *Chair: Professor Wade Jacoby, Brigham Young University*
- **Poland**  
     Dr Paul Latawski, RMA Sandhurst
  - **The Czech Republic**  
     Dr Marie Vlachova, Czech MoD
  - **Hungary**  
     Dr Pal Dunay, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- 19:00-19:30**     Drinks Reception (Ramslade Room)
- 19:30-21:30**     Silver Service Conference Dinner (Main Dining Hall)

**Day Three: Saturday 28<sup>th</sup> April**

- 07:00-08:30**     Breakfast (Main Dining Hall)
- 09:00-10:30**     ***Central and Eastern European Experiences: NATO Applicants***  
 Session Five     *Chair: Professor Helen Wallace, University of Sussex*
- **Romania**  
     Mr Marian Zulean, International Affairs Department,  
     Romanian Presidency.

- **The Slovak Republic**  
Dr Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, US Army War College
  - **Bulgaria**  
Dr Laura Cleary, Stirling University
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee (Ramslade Room)
- 11:00-12:30** ***Central and Eastern European Experiences: The Baltic States***  
Session Six
- Chair: Professor Constantine Danopoulos, San Jose State University*
- **Estonia**  
Lt Col German Kesa, Estonian Army
  - **Latvia**  
Dr Jan Trapans, University of Groningen
  - **Lithuania**  
Mr Robertas Sapronas, Lithuanian MoND
- 12:30-13:30** Lunch (Main Dining Hall)
- 13:30-1500** ***Central and Eastern European Experiences: South-Eastern Europe***  
Session Seven
- Chair: Mr Malcolm Haworth, Deputy Director, DCEE MoD*
- **Slovenia**  
Professor Erik Kopac, University of Ljubljana
  - **Croatia**  
Dr Alexander Bellamy, KCL/JSCSC
  - **FRY**  
Dr James Gow, KCL
- 15:00-15:30** Coffee (Ramslade Room)
- 15:30-17:00** ***Central and Eastern European Experiences: The Former Soviet Union***  
Session Eight
- Chair: Ms Oksana Antonenko, IISS*
- **Russia**  
Dr Dale Herspring, Kansas State University
  - **Ukraine**  
Mr James Sherr, University of Oxford / CSRC Camberly

**18:30-19:30** Dinner (Main Dining Hall)

**Evening** Cultural Event

**Day 4: Sunday 29<sup>th</sup>**

**07:00-08:30** Breakfast (Main Dining Hall)

**09:00-12:00** Cultural Visit: Tour of Oxford Colleges

**13:00-13:45** Lunch (Main Dining Hall)

**Afternoon** Departure of Participants

## ANNEX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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